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RELEASEMENT AND SEDUCTION:
HEIDEGGER AND BAUDRILLARD
ON THE PRESERVATION OF ILLUSION
IN THE EPOCH OF OBSCENITY
Marc Oliver D. Pasco
Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
This work interfaces the philosophies of Jean Baudrillard and Martin
Heidegger. It hopes to contribute to both Heideggerian and
Baudrillardian scholarship by employing Baudrillardian ideas in more
effectively describing the historical happening of the so-called
withdrawal of Being from man, which preoccupied much of Heidegger’s
body of work. The work argues that by re-visiting an earlier idea of
Baudrillard, which he termed as seduction, one finds a possible way of
navigating the obscenity of the current epoch of Being. Akin to
Heidegger’s idea of Gelassenheit or releasement, Baudrillard’s concept
of seduction invites one to allow the real to once again appear, no longer
by way of subjective representation, but to let it appear in its very
disappearance in hyperreality.
INTRODUCTION
In his book Broken Hegemonies, Reiner Schürmann (2003, 10) puts forward the
idea of hegemonic fantasms—a referent that “enjoins us in a way of being, signaling
to us what we have to be.” These fantasms are “ultimate referents and supreme
standards” (Schürmann 2003, 8) that legitimize and even coerce thinking into
understanding truth in a particular historical epoch, instituting possibilities and
impossibilities for an entire age. He discusses three main hegemonic fantasms: “the
Greek dream of the one that holds together, the Latin fantasm of an order that makes
nature the dispenser of justice, and the modern fantasm which is defined as the regime
of consciousness that ends in the ideal of a referential self-consciousness” (Schmidt,
2005, 2). By focusing on the modern fantasm, it may be said that the engine that
powers and makes possible the happening and meaning of history in such an age is the
dream not merely of absolute knowledge, but total control and domination by
consciousness over Being that serves as the ultimate horizon of the real. From the
Cartesian self-certain cogito to the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, consciousness is
designated as the ground upon which every happening owes its historical reality to. In
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the modern fantasm begins with self-certainty
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and reaches its apogee in the age of modern technology where both history and reality
become a function of the blind drive towards ever greater control.
In his works, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), Heidegger (2006)
speaks of this modern fantasm through his idea of machination (Machenschaft).
Machenschaft for Heidegger signals the abandonment of thinking by Being when
history is essentially held hostage by the coercive and seductive power of the idea of
mastery. He (2006, 12) writes:
Machination here means the makeability of beings, which produces
as well as makes up everything such that only in this makeability the
beingness of beings that are abandoned by be-ing (and by the grounding
of its truth) determines itself. (Here, makeable is thought as “watchable”=
watchful. And hence makeability is thought in the sense of producibility).
Machination means the accordance of everything with producibility
indeed in such a way that the unceasing, unconditioned reckoning of
everything is pre-directed.
For Heidegger, the metaphysics of modernity, which serves as the basis for modern
science and technology, is ushered in by the historical withholding of Beyng (Being?)
of itself from man that destines man into a mode of comportment that responds to
beings from the perspective of makeability or producibility. Machenschaft is closely
intertwined with power (Macht) and violence (Gewalt). Power secures the willful
exercise of violence that seeks nothing less than the total annihilation of individuality
through various schemes of calculation. For Heidegger, mastery by way of calculation,
violence through the measured exercise of power constitutes the essential unfolding of
the relationship between man and Being in the modern epoch.
While today’s age may still be construed as a function of the age of machination,
as we would imagine Heidegger to think, it may still be asked whether there is a more
nuanced and accurate way of depicting the contemporary epoch. While Heidegger’s
critique of modern technology has inarguably been vital in philosophically deciphering
the historical events of the modern epoch, it remains important to ask whether his
views are still specifically responsive to the contemporary era. In other words, may we
venture to ask whether we have crossed over into a completely new epoch of Being’s
withdrawal from humanity?
It is my position that Jean Baudrillard’s thoughts on simulation and hyperreality
can provide us a more appropriate lens for what I call the epoch of the obscene, the age
which succeeds the age of modern technology. We exist in a time of crisis, a turning
point, a time when new decisions must be made with respect to the question of what it
means to be, to be human, and to be human with others. We are in a transitional point
in history, moving from the age of modern technology to the age of obscenity of the
virtual and the hyperreal. Baudrillard (2000, 67) observes that:
By shifting to a virtual world, we go beyond alienation, into a state of
radical deprivation of the Other, or indeed of any otherness, alterity, or
negativity. We move into a world where everything that exists only as
idea, dream, fantasy, utopia will be eradicated because it will immediately
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be realized, operationalized. Nothing will survive as an idea or a concept.
You will not even have time enough to imagine. Events, real events, will
not even have time to take place. Everything will be preceded by its
virtual realization. We are dealing with an attempt to construct an entirely
positive world, a perfect world, expurgated of every illusion, of every sort
of evil and negativity exempt from death itself.
This is indeed the epoch of the obscene, where the happening of history becomes
ontologically preceded by its virtual representation, it is a model or simulation, a time of
the immediate sublimation of possibility into reality, where the enframing of modern
technology starts to succumb to the hypertrophic and metastatic colonization of
hyperreality over all aspects of daily human life. Hyperreality is the result of the
eradication of the real and its representational double, destroying referentiality and
meaning in the process. The epoch of modern technology transformed and reduced
beings into objects and ultimately into Bestand or standing-reserve. But given the present
state of affairs, it may be surmised that after the epochal transmutation of Being into
objects, their perpetual visibility and replicability through virtual reality and various
information and communications technology platforms, have caused their implosion into
fractal components of self-repeating and self-grounding images that terminate in the
obscenity of the hyperreal. This obscenity “begins precisely when there is no more
spectacle, no more scene when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when
everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and
communication” (Baudrillard 2012, 26). This is the epoch of the total mediatization of
history, where media narratives precede reality, where the map, as Baudrillard states,
precedes the territory, where the exponential growth of the amount of accessible
information devours itself, and along with it, history as we know it. Before this current
age, reality was seen as something to be unlocked, harnessed, and tamed. But the
hegemonic fantasm of the self-certain subject which used to rule over modernity has
been slowly eroded in this epoch, where the unadulterated fulfillment of the desire for
exposure and information overwhelms and breaches the subjective distance from reality
necessary for maintaining the illusion of knowledge and control.
In effect, this work initiates a dialogue between a philosopher that essentially
started noticing the perilous symptoms of modernity in the atomic age and a thinker
that lived through its fruition and experienced first-hand the eventual practical effects
of a metaphysics that grounded itself in the certitude of the cogito in this obscene epoch
of information. There is not much exhaustively comprehensive literature that
interfaces Heideggerian and Baudrillardian ideas. This work hopes to contribute to
both Heideggerian and Baudrillardian scholarship by employing Baudrillardian ideas
in more effectively describing the historical happening of the so-called withdrawal of
Being from man, which preoccupied much of Heidegger’s body of work.
A PRELIMINARY
HYPERREALITY

SKETCH

OF

BAUDRILLARD’S

IDEAS

ON

Baudrillard begins his discussion of hyperreality by citing Borges’ fable in
which cartographers of an empire drew up a map so detailed that it ended up covering
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the territory exactly. The point is that the cartographers were able to perfectly copy
reality in such a way that one can say it is as good as the real itself. However,
Baudrillard observes that in today’s epoch, it is the simulacrum or the copy that
precedes the real (think of digital geo-mapping, deep fakes, and Google maps), and
reality is not only eclipsed but is actually substituted by simulacra.
The key to understanding Baudrillard’s notion of simulation and hyperreality is
his idea concerning models. The operation of simulation is “neither discursive nor nondiscursive, but nuclear and genetic” (Baudrillard 1994, 2). Baudrillard envisions
hyperreality as the end product of a total simulation based on computerized models
produced by a code that produces a purely operational form of reality whose origin,
function, and purpose become practically and metaphysically irrelevant. In the
contemporary age of simulation, the model is not merely a representation of a reality
but a functional representation that eclipses the real itself. For instance, insofar as
running on a treadmill is supposed to simulate “real” running, the treadmill as a
functional model of the union of the biological study of physical fitness and
mechanical engineering, embodies the functional definition of “fitness” and creates an
entirely new world of running around it, with its own speed, cadence, gear, and
ambiance. Running on a treadmill is both real running and not, so to speak. It is not
merely an imaginary rendering of real running but is the colonization of the real
experience of running by the precession of its simulation as perfectly executed by the
model. It is hyperrealized running. The hyperreal image not only hides the real, but it
also displaces it and overwhelms representation with its absolute proximity,
immediacy, and endless reproduction through the precession of the model, which
exists solely in the sphere of operationability.
The epoch of hyperreality is the obscene erasure of the distance between
spectator and spectacle that is used to protect the subject from absolute transparency
unto itself by perfect reduplication. The existence of a mirror shields the subject from
total visibility. However, in the epoch of the obscene, where mirrors are reproduced on
a massive scale, representation becomes a reality where the vertiginous reproduction of
signs, images, and information places the dream of reality beyond nostalgia and memory
through the instantaneous, real-time rendering of its affects. As Baudrillard observes,
“The end of the spectacle brings with it the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, the
meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another reproductive medium
such as advertising or photography. Through reproduction from one medium into
another, the real becomes volatile, it becomes the allegory of death, but it also draws
strength from its own destruction, becoming the real for its own sake, a fetishism of the
lost object which is no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denegation
and its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal” (1993, 71-72). The endless and
meticulous reproduction and proliferation of the real through the technological,
informational processes of media precipitate the death of the real, its annihilation from
the sphere of relevance. Hyperreality is the performance of the real’s inchoate and
inevitable disappearance from history--the meticulous murder of the real by the
simulacrum. For him, “things visible do not come to an end in obscurity and in silence—
instead, they fade into what is more visible than the visible: obscenity” (1990, 11).
Insofar as the transformation of our understanding and experience of reality are
concerned, the speculative strain of the metaphysics of antiquity has indeed given way
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to a more scientific and functional reckoning of the question of what it means to be.
Reality is no longer merely an object of intellectual contemplation to be kept at a
distance, but an invitation towards enterprise, where the novelty of techniques and
perspectives for its dissection and magnification is rewarded not only by knowledge,
but by predictive control, remote accessibility, efficient manageability, and immediate
reproducibility. It is at this point where Heidegger’s ideas on machination
(Machenschaft) and Enframing (Gestell) may prove useful as historical and
hermeneutic tools in understanding the philosophical underpinnings of the epochal
shifts that brought about the requisite transformations of the way we stand in relation
to the real from the way it was perceived as something out there to be seen and known
into something on standby to be manipulated, reproduced, and simulated.
MACHENSCHAFT AND THE REAL
Between 1936 and 1940, specifically in his works Contributions to Philosophy
and Mindfulness, Heidegger anchored his critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity
in modernity with the idea of Machenschaft. Literally translated as machination, the
ordinary definition carries the meaning of a certain plotting or devising a certain plan
with a certain devious end in mind. However, in the second section of the
Contributions, Heidegger (1999, 88) defines machination as:
[Machenschaft] should immediately point to making (ποίησις τέχνη),
which we, of course, recognize as a human comportment. However, this
comportment itself is only possible on the basis of an interpretation of
beings which brings their makeability to the fore, so much so that
beingness is determined precisely as constancy and presence. That
something makes itself by itself and is thus also makeable for a
corresponding procedure says that the self-making by itself is the
interpretation of φύσις that is accomplished by τέχνη and its horizon of
orientation, so that what counts now is the preponderance of the makeable
and the self-making. . . in a word: Machination.
Machination holds sway over the modern epoch as the echo of the abandonment
of Beyng of man as it hides itself in its essential concealment. Heidegger’s Destruktion
or historical critique of metaphysics finds its early articulation in the writings of the
late 1930s, from his four-volume work on Nietzsche and the aforementioned works
above. These writings speak of Machenschaft as the prevailing epoch which sends
humanity on its way towards its destined oblivion of Being/Beyng. Machenschaft,
Heidegger’s early permutation of Gestell represents the apogee of subjectivity’s willfull but essentially aimless march towards ever greater technologization. In this state
of abandonment, humanity becomes caught up in the business of continuous
calculation of probabilities with respect to the rate by which the world itself shall be
completely objectified and mapped by the representations of subjectivity. Oblivious to
the echo of the truth of being and lacking distress with respect to its perilous condition,
humanity is left obsessed with calculation, acceleration, and massiveness.
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In calculation, humanity secures its destiny within the horizon of mathematical
certainty. Calculation is the basis of all steering, planning, and experimentation that
leads to further efficiency in managing beings, at the expense of the incalculable,
which is assumed to eventually be assimilated into the realm of calculation (Heidegger
1999, 84). Calculation projects in advance what it wants to see in reality. It plots all
possible configurations of the real and reduces reality into numbers, essentially
displacing the essential experience of reality as phusis and alētheia. When calculation
forms part of the primary comportment of humanity in the world, the world itself
becomes subsumed under the law of statistical probabilities and mathematical
conjectures that are practically “allergic” reactions and form part of the violent
domination (Gewalt) against the inherent mystery of the real. As Heidegger explains,
“that interpretation of beings as representable and re-presented. In one respect,
representable means ‘accessible through intention and calculation’; in another respect, it
means ‘advanceable through production and execution.’ But thought in a fundamental
manner, all of this means that beings as such are re-presentable and that only the
representable is” (Heidegger 1999. 76). In calculation, reality is a function of
representation. Mathematics is not found in nature but constitutes a system of a priori
stipulations projected by consciousness, which levels reality to fit in a particular ground
plan that accommodates and assimilates, in strict adherence to a commitment to
exactitude. Exactitude yields predictability, which then fosters the continuous production
and reproduction of the real within the matrix of the calculable. The ontology of
representation is exclusively a projection of subjective/scientific constitution.
Acceleration “means not-being-able-to-bear the stillness of hidden growth and
awaiting; the mania for what is surprising, for what immediately sweeps [us] away and
impresses [us], again and again, and in different ways” (Heidegger 1999, 84).
Humanity’s calculative disposition towards the real necessarily involves an obsession
with speed. The recently deceased cultural critic, Paul Virilio (1991, 100), said that “With
speed, the world keeps coming at us, to the detriment of the object, which is itself now
assimilated to the sending of information.” Acceleration views the enhancement of
reality and humanity’s experience of it in purely quantitative terms categorized mainly
in terms of data. More experiences, more knowledge, more areas covered in the shortest
amount of time is the teleological motivation behind the fascination with acceleration.
As Heidegger (1999, 84) says, “Its place is taken by the restlessness of the always
inventive operation, which is driven by the anxiety of boredom”. Acceleration does not
have the patience to allow the moment to while away, so to speak—to let it unfold in
accordance with its own nature. Just think of how an innocuous gadget like a smart tv
remote gives us a sense of power over time and displaces the experience of temporality,
of having-to-be-in-the-present-anticipating-the-future. Acceleration corresponds to
humanity’s inability to tarry with what calls for attention, as it is perpetually distracted
by the anxiety of having always to be one step ahead of unconcealment.
Calculated and accelerated reality defines what Heidegger calls lived experience
(Erlebnis), in that “only what presses forth into the sphere of live-experience, only
what man is able to bring to and before himself, [only that] can count as ‘a being’”
(Heidegger 1999, 90). In this respect, only that which is lived out or experienced by
subjectivity counts as real. The object-ness of the real is constituted by the calculative
operations of the subject, which therefore begs the question, “What makes reality,
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real?” Reality becomes a construct, an object to be produced, taken in hand,
manipulated, and curated to be fashioned in accordance with current human ends.
Thirdly, the outbreak of massiveness corresponds to humanity’s predilection for
what is popular and what is deemed relevant by the public. As Heidegger says, “What
is common to the many and to all is what the ‘many’ know as what towers over them.
Hence, responding to calculation and acceleration, just as on the other hand calculation
and acceleration provide massiveness with its track and scope” (Heidegger 1999, 85).
Calculability and acceleration necessarily lead to the representation of the world as
revealed through the eyes of what is common and easily accessible to all. Opinion is
the language of massiveness, but opinion not in the sense of irrational sentimentality,
but its opposite—rational calculability, which gains the approval of all, oblivious to
that which has abandoned thinking a long time ago. Events that get humanity’s
attention are manufactured events, spectacular displays of novelty and ingenuity that
cater to the curiosity of the everyday man. The real becomes what everyone perceives
as real, and calculative science, as the language of reality, reduces reality to how
everyone judges what counts or does not count as real.
The epochal reign of machination, calculability, acceleration, and the outbreak
of massiveness lead to what Heidegger calls the epoch of total lack of questioning and
enchantment. The leveling down of possibilities, the triumph of the average, and the
pervasive spread of mindless curiosity are essentially a function of how the real is
revealed in the age of Machenschaft. The lack of questioning, or as Heidegger says,
the lack of distress in the age of machination “is the greatest where self-certainty has
become unsurpassable, where everything is held to be calculable and, above all, where
it is decided, without a preceding question, who we are and what we are to do—where
knowing awareness has been lost without its ever actually having been established that
the actual self-being happens by way of a grounding-beyond-oneself, which requires
the grounding—space and its time. This, in turn, requires knowing what is ownmost
to truth as what knowing cannot avoid” (Heidegger 1999, 87). When lived-experience
or representation becomes the default comportment of humanity with respect to the
real, the make-ability of reality is brought to the fore as a function of the oblivion of
humanity’s ennownment to Beyng. Representational thinking produces the object as
that which is natural (not in the sense of phusis) or as that which is beyond the reach
of questioning—the logical and self-evident.
The epoch of Machenschaft finds its mature elaboration in the later works of
Heidegger when he includes Gestell, Bestand, and Herausfordern to the lexicon of
essential words that illumine the epochal transformation of the real in the age of
modern technology. The ordering tendency, the domination of representation, and the
unabated exercise of power over beings set up the “age of the world picture.”
Enframing, the essence of modern technology, secures for the epoch of withdrawal, its
culmination—the annihilation of objects into standing-reserve.
THE REAL AS A PICTURE, THEN AS STOCKPILE
In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger (1977, 4) claims that “the
essence of technology is nothing technological.” He argues that the view which
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interprets technology within the context of instrumentalization misses the more
essential point of understanding it as a way by which reality is revealed to us. He traces
the etymological affinity of techné with poiésis and phusis, claiming that all are modes
of alétheia. What is crucial, however, is to think about the distinguishing trait of
modern technology. Heidegger says that modern technology works within the ambit
of a kind of revealing that not only reveals beings as objects of representation under
the aegis of the subiectum. The essence of modern technology as a historical event of
truth to which humanity responds challenges human beings to reveal the real not only
as objects of representation but as stockpile, as “stuff” that must always be ready for
further ordering, always on standby, available and readily at one’s disposal.
In the Age of the World Picture, Heidegger (1977, 134) says that “The
fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The word
‘picture’ [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man’s
producing which represents and sets before”. In other words, man, as subiectum,
weaves the fabric of the real, as if he was standing as opposed to it as its maker. If
representation builds a picture of the real, Gestell breaks down the image within the
frame, breaks it down to pixels, and stores it for further enhancement, reconfiguration,
and recycling, so to speak. The real is that which is recyclable, i.e., that which is always
ready to be re-purposed and restored behind what actually shows itself as a picture.
Being, reduced to standing-reserve or Bestand represents the nebulous potentiality of
the real to be further actualized in a manifold of ways. Responsive to the
unconcealment of Being, humanity not only restlessly looks for more reality to make,
it aggressively stockpiles the real for the sole purpose of accumulating more
permutations of reality that can be exploited for further stockpiling. The real as a
picture is eclipsed by its own mutation into standing-reserve. Bestand represents a
“picture” of reality in maximum activity through the total positivization of potentiality,
availability, and malleability. The real as stockpile should not only be understood as
the transformation of everything into objects or things kept ready for use. The real as
standing-reserve is the dissolution of the object itself as it transforms into pure energy,
ready to be whatever it can be as deemed necessary by the historical destining of the
withdrawal of the essential unfolding of reality as alētheia. Bestand is the real viewed
as energy, unlimited by form and boundless in potential. While Machenschaft
emphasizes the representability of the real as an object of scientific construction,
Gestell goes beyond the object-ness of objects and underscores the almost transmetaphysical character of the real—as pure, potent, reproducible energy, the primal
clay of creation, as it were, with which the real as we know it is permitted to stay
around and linger for a while until destining itself finds a new purpose for it.
The practical consequence of the reign of Enframing for post-industrial society
in the late twentieth century, specifically with the digital revolution in the field of
information and communication technologies, is the radical reproducibility and
enhanced rendering of the virtual as a substitute for the real. Heidegger had always
thought of himself as a preparatory thinker. His thought, as he himself had described,
are pathmarks (Wegmarken) that, if one follows, may lead one to a clearing (Lichtung).
As such, it is only necessary that those who follow his lead become attuned to the
possibilities proffered by his thoughts. It is the position of this work that Enframing,
the essence of the epochal sending of Being in the age of modern technology, is not
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the final phase or consummation of the metaphysical oblivion of humanity from Being.
There is a succeeding historical phase of the real, which Heidegger, having died in
1976, was not privy to. Before one sets one’s eye to the so-called “turning” of Being,
one sees that reality as we know it in the post-industrial society, has been transformed
into something other than Bestand. The latent possibilities within the ambit of the
unconcealment of the real as standing-reserve, as energy, has in fact given rise and
morphed into a distinctly postmodern form of an object, but an object that transcends
the language of machination or representation. In other words, the stockpile, the energy
is no longer simply on standby, useful only at the behest of subjectivity that deems it
as a resource for its projects.
Machination and Enframing are both correlatives of a particularly
scientific/mathematical certainty that necessarily takes for granted the question of
whether the real is indeed what representational certainty purports it to be. But what if
by some chance, some happening, the real “decided” to disentangle itself from the
clutches of subjectivity and extinguished its secret by being perpetually exposed,
simulated, and reproduced? What if, after its transformation into the endless
possibilities maintained under the auspices of Enframing, it was able to actualize itself
into a new form that challenges the traditional framework of the subject-object
dichotomy that is grounded in certitude? In other words, what if the real became more
real than what we thought of it, and its truth too true to be doubted ala Descartes, such
that certitude is bypassed, leaving humanity in a state of schizophrenic stupor?
Baudrillard names this postmodern object the hyperreal—that which is more
real than the real. Hyperreality is a simulation that defies the logic of the subject-object
representation and reveals the real not only as a stockpile, but as that which undercuts
the processes of representation and imagination, as always already reproduced,
consumed, and virtually connected to. The hyperreal is the image of the real that has
taken over, displaced, and replaced the original object. In so doing, it effectively
extinguishes the real as we know it, not by dissolution, but by nihilation through
infinite reproduction and proliferation. This then inaugurates a new metaphysics of the
no(thing); i.e., a metaphysics of the real as a thing no longer (traditionally understood
as res extensa or even as energeia), but of the real, as constituted beyond the auspices
of the subject-object relation thereby undermining the constitutive powers of the
subject with respect to what it encounters.
This epochal development in the history of Beyng succeeds the epoch of modern
technology, and this work calls this the epoch of obscenity. These two ages are not
mutually exclusive but represent an epochal continuity within which the destined
oblivion of Beyng remains. In other words, obscenity is a necessary historical
consequence of machination and Enframing. The very possibility of simulation and
hyperrealization of the real was already incipient within its purview being revealed to
humanity as representation and stockpile. Viewed from the position of the digital age
of information, Heidegger’s description of the age of modern technology appears to
shift from a purely exclusive modern critique of the dominant anthropocentric
scientific worldview into a postmodern prologue for what was to come. The obscene
is the progeny of technology, not solely in functional terms, but more importantly, it is
its metaphysical successor with respect to how the real is revealed to humanity in the
current epoch. As hyperreal, the real is obscene, too real, and too close for comfort,
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negating the once safe space of rational subjective representation by way of its
instantaneous simulation, radical availability, infinite reproducibility, and total
visibility.
When Heidegger spoke of the Rhine river, lamenting the loss of humanity’s
poetic experience of water to the power of Enframing that reveals the water as mere
standing-reserve for energy demand, the hydroelectric power plant did not reveal itself
as obscene. It still fell within the purview of subjective metaphysical representation.
Today, however, when humanity’s experience of water is the bottled mineral water—
water infinitely reproduced in a series without any reference to an origin, always
already cleansed, reproduced, and deployed for anonymous consumption, the reality
of water itself becomes obscene. It becomes more water than water—hyperwater,
cleansed of every microbe, sanitized and distilled, yet alienated from the technological
processes that produce it, maintaining a life of its own devoid of technological origin,
populating every nook and cranny of consumer culture, obscenely ubiquitous,
eradicating the difference between need and luxury, clean and unclean, resource and
waste. Hyperreality is precisely like bottled water, neither an exploitable resource nor
a poetic reminder of the fourfold. It is water stripped of both technology and illusion;
it is more water than water. The metaphysics of hyperreality is defined as the
eradication of the real by exterminating any semblance of illusion and nullifying
absence and withdrawal through interminable presence.
THE REAL AS HYPERREAL
The current digital revolution, prefigured in the rise of the network society,
brokered by the global use of the internet, saw a historically unprecedented expansion
of humanity’s virtual perception of its lifeworld. In fact, as early as the rise of radio
and television broadcast media, Marshall McLuhan (2003, 420) had already foreseen
how these new “extensions of our central nervous system” would eventually lead to a
global village where connectedness through information would be of chief value.
Dreyfus and Spinosa (2003, 318) observed that the shift from modernity to
postmodernity had transformed the subject from one who was obsessed with collecting
objects through representation into a protean being that is in constant search for
information and connection. Mikkel Tin (2010, 868) further claims that “In a world of
simulacra there is neither grounding nor phenomenon, there is nothing but a circuit of
reflexes.” Slavoj Zizek (1999) likewise warns of the immersive capabilities of the
digitalized universe of simulation that can precisely implode the ontological difference
between the Real and the Imaginary especially from the perspective of “those who see
in it a dystopian prospect of individuals regressing to pre-symbolic psychotic immersion,
of losing the symbolic distance that sustains the minimum of critical/ reflective attitude
(the idea that the computer functions as a maternal Thing that swallows the subject, who
entertains an attitude of Incestuous fusion towards it)” (1999, 111). These various
perspectives on the status of the real and its relation to the subject in postmodernity all
suggest a particular sense of paranoia—a cautionary tale of being trapped within an
imploded universe, where sensory data is so extremely dense that subjectivity has no
other choice but to retreat by surrendering the fort of representation to the now obscene
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configurations and reproductions of the once represented, previously known as the
object. According to Baudrillard (1996, 30), hyperreality
…has nothing to do with representation, and even less to do with
aesthetic illusion. The whole generic illusion of the image is canceled out
by technical perfection. As hologram or virtual reality or threedimensional picture, the image is merely the emanation of the digital code
which generates it. It is merely the mania for making an image no longer
an image or, in other words, it is precisely what removes a dimension
from the real world.
The virtual image, in this case, is precisely the extermination of the real by the
deletion of its counterpart—an illusion. In this sense, Baudrillard argues that the
perfection of the real’s double, the ultra-accurate rendering of its copy, is essentially
more real than the real because it is able to transcend the duality of truth and falsity
by way of the total subversion of the question of the real itself, and this is precisely
the logic of the hyperreal. The death of illusion simultaneously spells the
extermination of the real. In making this claim, Baudrillard alludes to Heidegger and
says, “With virtual reality and all its consequences, we have passed over into the
extreme of technology, into technology as an extreme phenomenon. Beyond the end,
there is no longer any reversibility; there are no longer any traces of the earlier world,
nor is there even any nostalgia for it. This hypothesis is much graver than that of
technological alienation or Heidegger’s Gestell” (1996, 33-34). This statement
openly shows Baudrillard’s thoughts on the limit of Heidegger’s critique of modern
technology. While it must be submitted that technology does play a role in the
hyperrealization of the contemporary epoch, hyperreality itself is something that
goes beyond the radical objectivization of the real into standing-reserve. The
hypothesis, while still falling under the scope of Heidegger’s understanding of truth
as unconcealment, nonetheless imparts a novel perspective in discourses concerning
the very possibility of a retrieval (wiederholung) of the original truth of Being in an
epoch where the very notion of truth as certitude is seemingly undermined by the
collapse of certitude by way of its hyper-double—the radical indifference of
subjectivity with respect to what reveals itself. In other words, hyperreality no longer
incites questions of credibility or fidelity but operates independently of these
categories as such. The unquestioning acceptance of the current generation towards
the colonization of the virtual over the Lebenswelt is a testament to the power of this
current destining of Being’s historical withdrawal. As Baudrillard (2000, 200) astutely
remarks:
In this precise sense, the commonplace according to which the
problem with cyberspace is that reality is virtualized, so that instead of
the flesh-and-blood presence of the Other, we get a digitalized spectral
apparition, misses the point: what brings about the ‘loss of reality’ in
cyberspace is not its emptiness (the fact that it is lacking with respect to
the fullness of the real presence) but, on the contrary, its very excessive
fullness (the potential abolition of the dimension of symbolic virtuality).
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Baudrillard claims that ours is a time of “promiscuity, of total contiguity” (2015, 44).
The epoch of the obscene discharges the power of the hyperreal by abolishing the
distance between scene and spectator, resulting in the radical positivization of the
real—the total visibility of the real in its scene-less proximity, along with the
dissolution of the line that used to demarcate the boundaries between fact and fiction,
real and fake, subject and object. Comparing the current epoch of obscenity to the
modern age of representation, Baudrillard (2003, 27) expounds:
‘Scene’ and ‘obscene’ do not, of course, have the same etymology,
but it is tempting to connect the two. For as soon as there is a scene or a
stage, there is gaze and distance, play and otherness. The spectacle is
bound up with the scene. On the other hand, when we are in obscenity,
there is no longer any scene or stage, any play, and the distance of the
gaze is abolished. Let us take the pornographic sphere: it is clear that in
pornography, the body is, in its entirety, realized. Perhaps the definition
of obscenity might be, then, the becoming-real, the becoming-absolutelyreal, of something which until then was treated metaphorically or had a
metaphorical dimension.
In the epoch of the obscene, the real becomes a fetish, an irrational indulgence
that transgresses the metaphysical rules which distinguished being from non-being by
way of immediate availability and instantaneous reproducibility. When the illusion is
decimated by the technical perfection of simulation, reality loses the possibility of
semblance, of negation, which anchors it within the realm of traditional metaphysics.
Even Plato needed the shadows to produce the possibility of the Forms. In obscenity,
shadow and reality implode and collapse into one another, resulting in a mesmerizing
extravaganza of radical profusion, neutralized only by the limits of its own making.
When everything is exposed to the light of digital information and virtual simulation,
when nothing escapes the search parameters of the internet, when everything that has
been written, photographed, video-recorded, made, have been digitally rendered and
virtually roams cyberspace are simultaneously available for everyone at any time, the
world itself becomes nothing but a carcass of the virtual, a memento of a deserted
world where human beings used to live. These are not mere shadows, nor copies, or
replicants, but hyperreal entities that expose more of the real than ever before.
Baudrillard (2001, 29) reflects on what happens in pornography to illustrate his point:
The obscenity itself burns and consumes its object. One sees from up
close what one has never seen before; to one’s good fortune, one has
never seen one’s genitals function from so close, nor for that matter, from
so general a perspective. It is all too true, too near to be true. And it is this
that is fascinating, this excess of reality, this hyperreality of things. The
only phantasy in pornography, if there is one, is thus not a phantasy of sex
but of the real and its absorption into something other than the real, the
hyperreal. Pornographic voyeurism is not a sexual voyeurism, but a
voyeurism of representation and its perdition, a dizziness born of the loss
of the scene and the irruption of the obscene. Consequent to the
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anatomical zoom, the dimension of the real is abolished, the distance
implied by the gaze gives way to an instantaneous, exacerbated
representation, that of sex in its pure state, stripped not just of all seduction,
but of its image’s very potentiality. Sex so close that it merges with its own
representation: the end of perspectival space, and therefore, that of the
imaginary and of phantasy—end of the scene, end of an illusion.
The pornographic scene effectively eradicates the traditional meaning of a scene,
i.e., a situation involving spectator and spectacle, where the latter is constituted by the
gaze of the former, its meaning a function of intentionality. Such is the absurd anatomical
zooming-in to genitalia, unrecognizable due to the sheer proximity and total reality of
what appears. Pleasure, if this truly ever was the intention behind the production of
pornography, is not grounded in the seduction of sexuality or the fascination with the
Other, but emanates from the banality of exposure, of seeing for the sake of seeing, which
might constitute a fetish in itself. The spectacle consumes itself in the pornographic. It is
essentially onanistic, feasting on its own desire to expose itself, bereft of any deception
or illusion, reality robbed of its secret, raped not by mere curiosity, but by fetish in highdefinition, accommodating all possibilities of intentionality, motive, and utility. The real
in the age of simulation is pornographic for Baudrillard. It reveals itself in its naked glory,
pacifying the urges of representation, stunting the advance of objectivity by valorizing
transparency. Objectivity craves the challenge of opacity. The transparency produced by
the pornographication of the real in simulation inverts this desire and transmutes it into
stupefied fascination—the blasé attitude of contemporary humanity towards everything
it witnesses. When one sees everything, one sees nothing. Immersed in a pornographic
world, we seek refuge from this total transparency not by retreating to subjectivity but
by inane complicity, letting what shows itself show itself as if it didn’t matter anymore.
Schizophrenia becomes the primary condition of the subject in the epoch of
obscenity, the cause of its own withdrawal in the imploded dialectic between
representation and reality. The schizophrenic is not defined in its ordinary sense as a
condition of losing touch with the real. Scizophrenia in this context is defined as a state
of total vulnerability, the crumbling down of the fort of representation against the
overwhelming inertia of information and simulation. This condition drives subjectivity
to look at multiple places at the same time (think of how computer browsers have
developed from a solo interface into a multiple browser interface, allowing the user to
essentially multiply his gaze). Baudrillard (2012, 30) explains:
The schizophrenic is not, as generally claimed, characterized by his
loss of touch with reality, but by the absolute proximity to and total
instantaneousness with things, this overexposure to the transparency of
the world. Stripped of a stage and crossed over without the least obstacle,
the schizophrenic cannot produce the limits of his very being; he can no
longer produce himself as a mirror. He becomes a pure screen, a pure
absorption and resorption surface of the influent networks.
The person with schizophrenia is a victim of the obscene and the unwitting prey
of the screen. The docility of the real to the rule of hyperreality is evidenced by the
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negation of the distance between spectator and spectacle, where in effect, the gaze
ironically becomes a function of reality’s disappearance in its simulation. Baudrillard
foresees a future where “there will no longer be any thought-sensitive surface of
confrontation, any suspension of thought between illusion and reality. There will be
no blanks any more, no silences, no contradiction—just a single continuous flow, a
single integrated circuit” (2009, 40). One can envision Leibniz’ monad as the model
of human subjectivity in the near future. Everyone will casually be connected to “life”
by way of the screen as they hover aimlessly like satellites in cyberspace entertaining
casual visits from the “real world” if only to feed their bodies that may soon enough
find nourishment through cybernetic means and therefore liberate itself from the earth
as we know it. The screen will no longer project imitations or virtual renderings of the
real but will become the primary scene of existence.
The epoch of the obscene is the post-metaphysical implosion of the, on the one
hand, the machination of the technological, and the simulation of the hyperreal, on the
other. The traditional metaphysical claims to the grounds of the real must be reevaluated in light of its latest epochal permutation as hyperreality. When subjective
representation is short-circuited by the automatic operations of virtual simulation, one
must try to find a new Archimedian point, so to speak, if only temporarily (under
erasure, as Derrida would say), so that the principle of the real might still be salvaged,
whatever may be its current form or mode of unconcealment.
BAUDRILLARD’S SEDUCTION: THE OBJECTION OF THE OBJECT
Baudrillard’s intimations on the obscene are premised on a longing for secrecy
and illusion. Historically, reality was always seen as an overcoming of illusion, but never
its exterminator. Reality did not kill illusion; it preserved it by asserting its metaphysical,
ontological, epistemological, and ethical supremacy over it. Even Plato had a place for
the shadows, Christianity has had its extended battle with concupiscence after the Fall of
Man but continued to confirm its existence with its perpetual call for confession and
renewal. Descartes’ cogito needed God to keep the deceptive or illusory power of the
senses at bay, Kant maintained the necessity of an epistemological humility with respect
to the really real as knowledge may be interpreted as a form of rationally necessary
illusion, and Heidegger maintained the radical importance of concealment in making
space for a clearing. Baudrillard maintains that “the ‘murder of the Real’ (Baudrillard’s
phrase) does not occur in a world of imagination, illusion, and magic, but in a world
devoid of them” (2008, 66). He (1990, 65) adds, “For something to be meaningful, there
has to be a scene, and for there to be a scene, there has to be an illusion, a minimum of
illusion, of imaginary movement, of defiance to the real, which carries you off, seduces
or revolts you.” The proximate distance between the subject and the object is actually
the domain of the object. The distance covered by representation simultaneously marks
the withdrawal of the object into secrecy. He (2000, 75) adds:
“Knowledge” normally implies a dialectic between subject and object,
a field of representation where the subject is master of the game since the
subject constructed the frame of representation and projected it into the

Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 22, Number 1, 2021

ISSN 2244-1875

88 MARC OLIVER D. PASCO

world. This presupposes the privilege of the subject and the concomitant
inferior status of the object, including the scientific object. But knowledge
rules over truth and causal relations, not over appearance or illusion. In the
domain of the illusion, knowledge is no longer logically possible, for its
principles and postulates cannot function. And this is not just a
metaphysical insight: today, the microsciences stand at the point where the
object as such no longer exists. It vanishes, it escapes, it has no definite
status, it only appears in the form of ephemeral and aleatory traces on the
screens of virtualization. At their outer edge, the most advanced sciences
can only verify the object’s disappearance. In other words, they can only
verify the way the object plays with its own objectivity. This is the object’s
perverse strategy; perhaps it is a form of revenge. Apparently, the object is
a trickster, foiling all the protocols of the subject’s experiment so that the
subject itself loses its position as subject.
Baudrillard here alludes to quantum physics, where scientists have experienced
the uncanny behavior of particles that seem to defy the expected outcomes of the
scientific method, behaving as if they knew they were being watched, evading the
totalizing gaze of objectivity by way of radical movement and relativity. He opines in
effect that the object may very well be not just a docile fetish for subjectivity but has
within itself the capacity to elude the dialectic of meaning by reversing the gaze of the
subject towards it. The insatiability of knowledge, its patent appetite, the conatus
essendi of Spinoza, the assimilative gaze of the Same in Levinas, is merely a function
of the nauseating opacity and density of the object in its Sartrean sense. He thinks that
against the total positivization and exposure of the world in hyperreality, one must save
the seductive illusion of the objective. He expounds, “Against the extermination of
evil, of death, of illusion, against this Perfect Crime, we must fight for the criminal
imperfection of the world. Against this artificial paradise of technicity and virtuality,
against the attempt to build a world completely positive, rational, and true, we must
save the traces of the illusory world’s definitive opacity and mystery” (2000, 74). In
response to the assimilative function of representation, Baudrillard proposes the
possibility of seduction by the object. To be seduced is to be drawn by the elusively
enigmatic, by that which escapes the totalizing gaze of information and
communication, it is to be devoured by the secret of the object, to be captivated by its
appearance, its illusion. Seduction leads us astray from the projected path of knowing
into the world of illusion. Tracing its roots from the Latin, il-ludere, which means ‘in
play,’ Baudrillard somehow echoes Derrida’s concept of differance that highlights the
necessity of deferring the process of totalization by recognizing the flux and instability
inherent in the meaning of the real. While production is the prevailing logic of
obscenity and hyperreality, “seduction is, at all times and in all places, opposed to
production. Seduction removes something from the order of the visible, while
production constructs everything in full view, be it an object, a number or concept”
(Baudrillard 2001, 34). Ironically enough, I think it is actually this work from 1979
that provides a response to his seemingly bleak ruminations from 1981 onwards.
The modern project of total enlightenment, its drive towards ever-increasing
knowledge and control, has precipitated the epoch of the obscene. Ridding the world
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of appearances by displacing it with more and more reality has only ironically led to
the catastrophic dissolution of the real by its being too meaningful because of being
too exposed. The challenge of seduction is to let the object appear in its disappearance,
to allow appearance to happen beyond the pornographic exposure of obscenity. It is to
challenge the obscenity of the world where nothing appears anymore because
everything has always already been produced as a visible sign. As Baudrillard (1996,
16-17) expounds:
The proliferation of reality, its spreading like an animal species whose
natural predators have been eliminated, is our true catastrophe. This is the
inevitable fate of an objective world. We have to restore the potency and
the radical meaning of illusion, which is most often reduced to the level of
a chimaera diverting us from what is true: what things deck themselves out
in to hide what they are. When, in fact, the illusion of the world is the way
things have of presenting themselves for what they are when they are not
actually there at all. In appearance, things are what they give themselves
out to be. They appear and disappear without letting anything at all show
through. They unfurl without concern for their being or even for their
existence. They signal to us but are not susceptible to decipherment. On the
other hand, in simulation, in this giant dispositif of meaning, calculation,
and efficiency that encompasses all our technical devices, including current
virtual reality, the illusion of the sign is lost, and only its operation remains.
The happy non-distinction between true and false, between real and unreal,
gives way to the simulacrum, which consecrates the unhappy
nondistinction between true and false, between the real and its signs, the
unhappy, necessarily unhappy, destiny of meaning in our culture.
Baudrillard’s bargain seems to hinge upon the premise that despite the
colonization and domination of hyperreality in the epoch of the obscene, the object
asserts its objection, as it were. It stands its ground. The object is now interpreted as
a singularity—representing absolute uncertainty, a point of infinite possibilities, in
other words, of play. In astrophysics, the singularity is understood as the point in
space-time where the radical density of a particle resulted in the Big Bang.
Baudrillard uses this as a metaphor for the object in seduction, where the object
becomes non-interchangeable, a sui generis, exempt from the system of exchange
and the symbolic laws of value, radically other than any of its representation. The
object as a singularity represents a revolt, an insurrection against the totalizing
mechanisms of hyperreality.
Baudrillard’s idea of seduction, of the object’s revenge, is a viable counterpoint to
the obscenity of the age. In his studies of the works of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss
and the thinker Georges Bataille, Baudrillard became interested in the idea of a gift that
cannot be returned in primitive societies. This so-called accursed share is an object which
does not enter into the commerce of economic exchange, but that which cancels power
and debt, as a counter-gift, a singularity that is symbolic of an excess the resides outside
the logical equivalence of value in capitalist societies. Baudrillard (2003, 3) believes that
the object in symbolic exchange “has a life of its own.” This idea of radical alterity is a
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fatal strategy (a strategy that takes the side of the object, invested in the belief that the
object can outwit the subject) against the hegemonic systems of obscenity in capitalist
society. It is a call to keep one’s distance from the object, to let seduction take place,
instead of production, to allow the object to remain elusive and illusive, to let it remain
at play. It is as he (2005, 15) says, to preserve the “tremor” of the image:
There is an aphorism by Lichtenberg that speaks of “tremor.” Indeed,
all gestures, including the most assured, begin with a tremor, like a
fuzziness of motion. And there is always a trace of it left behind. Without
that tremor, that fuzziness, when a gesture is purely procedural, when it
is brought into perfect focus, we have something of the order of madness.
So, genuine images are those which attest that tremor of the world,
whatever the situation or the object: pictures of war, still-life
compositions, landscape, portrait, art, and documentary. At this point, the
image is something that belongs to the world; it is a part of its becoming,
it participates in the metamorphosis of appearances
This idea resonates with Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit, which to me is the
core of his understanding of phenomenology as early as Sein und Zeit. Both
Baudrillard and Heidegger see the possibility of a clearing only in the restoration of
distance, space, and mystery in a world that has grown addicted to simulated nearness
flattened cyberspace, and pornographic obscenity. This unexplored relation in the
respective ideas of these two thinkers provides a springboard not just for broader
scholarship but for critically understanding our current epoch.
RELEASEMENT, SEDUCTION, AND THE NECESSITY OF ILLUSION
In the obscenity of the pornographic exposure of simulation, Baudrillard calls
our attention to the illusion of the object, to its secret and seduction, believing perhaps
that it is only in the side of the object that humanity might find some relic of reality, if
only for a while. The kind of illusion Baudrillard speaks of is not the illusion proffered
by the simulation of the virtual, but the imperfect illusion of the image or the object.
He (1997, 7) says, “Virtuality tends toward the perfect illusion. But it isn’t the same
creative illusion as that of the image. It is a ‘recreating’ illusion (as well as a
recreational one), revivalistic, realistic, mimetic, hologrammatic. It abolishes the game
of illusion by the perfection of the reproduction, in the virtual rendition of the real. And
so we witness the extermination of the real by its double”. Baudrillard (1996, 75) thinks
that it is only in the seductive and creative illusion of the object that humanity might
safeguard some semblance of salvation for the real:
It is, henceforth, the object which refracts the subject and imposes upon
it its presence and its random form, its discontinuity, its fragmentation, its
stereophony, and its artificial instantaneity. It is the power of the object
which cuts a swathe through the very artifice we have imposed on it. There
is something of revenge in this: the object becomes a strange attractor.
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Stripped of all illusion by technology, stripped of all connotation of
meaning and value, exorbitated—i. e. taken out of the orbit of the subject—
it is then that it becomes a pure object, superconductive of illusion and nonmeaning. We are faced, ultimately, with two irreconcilable hypotheses: that
of the extermination of all the world’s illusion by technology and the
virtual, or that of an ironic destiny of all science and all knowledge in which
the world—and the illusion of the world—would survive.
In my opinion, Baudrillard’s radical stance compliments or, at the very least,
resonates with Heidegger’s call for releasement. Gelassenheit as an active-willing on
the part of humanity to let the thing play itself out, to take on a phenomenological
stance towards the real, to “let what shows itself be seen from itself just as it shows
itself as itself,” is suitable comportment if we are to take Baudrillard’s advice and let
the object retain its secret. While Baudrillard’s position still revolves around the
subject-object dichotomy, which was the fundamental ground of Heidegger’s critique
of anthropocentric metaphysics and technology, it may very well be a creative retrieval
of this modern opposition that can loosen the grip of obscenity over the current
generation of humanity. While Heidegger sealed the fate of the object with Gestell as
the object disappears into Bestand, Baudrillard, after having dissolved the subjectobject relation in the implosion of hyperreality, resuscitates its significance with the
hypothesis that maybe, it is the illusion of the object that is the last bastion to be
defended before reality is completely eradicated by the obscenity of hyperreality. And
perhaps, the way to defend it (which Baudrillard does not directly comment on) is to
apply Heidegger’s releasement with respect to the object. It is a challenge to recognize
and preserve singularities within the imploded world of simulation.
Akin to Heidegger’s contemplation on the thing, which is portrayed as
something which gathers the fourfold, showing precisely what is hidden as
hidden in its presence (the jug, the bridge, Van Gogh’s peasant shoes),
Baudrillard’s seduction is a call to preserve disappearance and illusion as vital
forces that can keep the crime of hyperreality against reality from being perfect
(by perfection, he means the total, pornographic exposure of the real and the
complete destruction of any secrecy). The thing and the work of art function in
the same way. Both things preserve concealment, mystery, and distance. The perfect
simulation of the world, the end of illusion and the overcoming of distance is the end
of the world. Perfection is death. When the world is expelled by its double, the world
disappears in its absolute appearance. In this context, it can be construed that both
Heidegger and Baudrillard tried to preserve the secret of the real, which they felt was
in danger of being completely exposed by the age of modern technology and the epoch
of obscenity, respectively. Both thinkers may be seen as wardens of the real (in the
case of Heidegger, of the event of the real). Truly, even Baudrillard was more
concerned with the destiny of the object than with anything else (so much so that the
object figures in all of his writings from The System of Objects to his last interviews
before his death in 2007). As Rex Butler (1997, 54) insightfully states:
The mistake Baudrillard’s commentators make is that they speak of
his work as simply doing away with the real: Baudrillard as the great
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contemporary thinker of the end of reality, of reality as a simulacrum, etc.
In fact, as opposed to this, Baudrillard’s work offers a defense of the real
against the efforts of all systems (including his own) to turn it into a
simulacrum, a way of thinking the real as the unsurpassable to all systems.
Baudrillard is a thinker not at all of reality as a simulacrum, but of the
possibility of reality when all is simulacrum.
While most of his writings since Simulacra and Simulation seem to have been
obsessed with simulation and the hyperreal, Baudrillard was actually far more
concerned with preserving the illusion of the world, to protect it from the invasive and
reductive operations of the obscene. History, like wine, needs time to breathe in order
to be real wine. When the real is instantly rendered into a news report, lights, drone
perspective, expert analyses, and all, it is robbed of its ability to speak, to be properly
understood by the subject. It becomes a parody of itself, absorbed in the gelatinous
blob of stuff and information in cyberspace. Baudrillard (2005, 14) elaborates:
Think about it: it is the virtual itself that is negationist. It is the virtual
that takes away the substance of the real, setting it off balance. We are
living in a society of negationism by virtue of its virtuality. Disbelief
reigns everywhere. No event is perceived as “real” anymore. Criminal
attempts, trials, wars, corruption, opinion polls: all of that is either
falsified or undecidable. State power and its institutions are the first
victims of the disgrace of the principle of reality. Hence the moral
urgency, in the face of rampant negationism, of recovering the “citizen’s
viewpoint,” taking one’s stand for reality, against the frailty of all
information. The mirror of information has been broken. The mirror of
historical time has been broken. This is why it has become possible to
negate the existence of the Shoah, together with the rest (the Pentagon
crash, man landing on the moon). The reign of the virtual is also the reign
of the principle of uncertainty. It is the inevitable counterpart of a reality
turned unreal by excess of positivity.
Meanwhile, in his essay, The Thing, Heidegger declares that “the frantic
abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness
of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture
on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from
us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is
great distance remoteness” (2001, 163). Though different in actual historical contexts
(Heidegger speaking from the context of the atomic age, and Baudrillard from the age
of simulation), these words resonate with Baudrillard’s critique of the current age of
hyperreality. Distance is the keyword that can serve as a point of intersection between
the two thinkers with respect to the question of the real. For Heidegger, a thing like a
jug is a reminder of distance, the distance between the fourfold that gathers them
together. It is their difference, their distance, that holds the jug together as an essentially
meaningful thing. While representation renders the jug as a mere object that owes its
existence to the making (Machenschaft) of the subject, genuine thought recognizes that
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objects are not things in this respect. It is only when the thing is allowed to shelter
distance that it harbors the possibility of nearness, of humanity’s nearness to the rest
of the fourfold (sky, earth, divinities). The thinging of the thing, the appropriation that
binds the four which bestows presencing to the thing is, in other words, a safekeeping
of distance.
For Heidegger, the technological oblivion of humanity in the age of Enframing
meets resistance in a thought that recognizes the difference between objects and things.
The epoch of the obscene, for Baudrillard, meets resistance in the illusion of the object.
While perhaps different in vocabulary, both thinkers place importance on the
preservation of distance and illusion. The real must be defended, with heedful thought
in Heidegger, and the preservation of seduction in Baudrillard. As Baudrillard (2005,
1) incisively remarks, “We are not talking here about philosophical morals, we are not
saying ‘the world is not what it should be’ or ‘the world is not what it used to be.’ The
world is the way it is. Once transcendence is gone, things are nothing but what they
are, and, as they are, they are unbearable. They have lost every illusion and have
become immediately and entirely real, shadowless, without commentary. At the same
time, this unsurpassable reality does not exist anymore.” The transcendence of the
object, guaranteed by illusion, its irreducible resistance to exposure is the last mark of
the real that must be preserved. Without its counterpoint, without its shadow, the real
becomes absolutely identical with itself, completely dominated by the obscenity of
hyperreality. Hyperreality is the death of the real by way of its perpetual resurrection
within the system of instantaneous information and digital simulation. It is a living
corpse, a zombie-like entity that presses forward without a sense of destiny—pure,
unadulterated obscenity. To let the object remain an object, to let the thing be a thing,
is to let reality disappear, and with this to allow it to appear as it is, as a singularity
invested with abundant possibilities.
CONCLUSION
This work tried to show how the real has manifested itself in the epoch of
modern technology, and now, in what I claim is the epoch of obscenity. Heidegger’s
critique of technology grounded its discourse in the modern problematic of alienation
between subject and object, in what would historically result in humanity’s uncanny
homelessness in his own abode. The Cartesian cogito became the subiectum, which
lies under everything known as real, the so-called Archimedian point of both
metaphysical and epistemological claims to truth with respect to what is real. Reality,
then, was equated with objectivity, that which is already represented by the subject and
is therefore constituted by the gaze of consciousness. This historical possibility is
opened by a destining in the history of Beyng that gave birth to Machenschaft, the
power of making and manipulation that exerts its dominance over the real, which
eventually translated into the challenging claim of Enframing, where all beings are
seen as stockpile, as energy to be ordered for further ordering. This is where
Heidegger’s critique of modernity ends—in the portrayal of a world abandoned by
Being, where humanity is left in a frantic goose chase for more fuel and energy to
power its future plans, where everything dissolves into Bestand.
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Heidegger’s insights, I felt, needed a bit of stretching, a widening of the horizon,
so to speak. Given that we are living past the atomic or industrial age and are now
immersed in the so-called post-industrial age of digital information, I thought perhaps
that Heidegger’s final depiction of the real in the epoch of modern technology may
have metamorphosed into something else, that maybe the real as standing-reserve took
on a new form—energy consolidated and applied in the age of digital simulation that
produced the hyperreal. The hyperreal, that which is more real than the real, is not false
reality or a mere construct of an intentional technological mindset but is the progeny
of the implosion of the traditional dichotomies of modernity, true and false, beautiful
and ugly, knowledge and opinion, etc. To see simulacra as mere technological
constructs is to miss the point of Baudrillard entirely. While technology does play a
big part in the production, reproduction, and proliferation of simulacra, it is, in
Heidegger’s words, nothing technological. Simulation, hyperreality, obscenity is an
event of the unfolding of truth, a subsequent stage in the destining of Being. In the age
of obscenity, the real is revealed as hyperreal. In the contemporary world of digital
computing, algorithmic processing of information, virtual reality, and web-powered
social media, the hyperreal is not merely rendered as a product of technology but
becomes the model by which the real is understood, judged, consumed, and
reproduced. Hyperreality is the fusion of the real and its opposites, which ceaselessly
exposes and juxtaposes everything with everything else on the flat surface of digitality,
creating a farcical world of pastiche, which is now considered as more real than the
real world. Hyperreality is the world turned inside out and outside in, simultaneously.
Both Heidegger and Baudrillard placed within their own historicalphilosophical critiques key ideas that may help us understand our standing in
respective epochs of Being. In the atomic age, Heidegger put forth the idea of
Gelassenheit, of letting-be, and subsequently, in the epoch of the obscene, Baudrillard
proffered us a rather old idea from his body of work—seduction. This work tried to
establish the relationship between these two “saving powers,” as Heidegger would say,
with the intention of simultaneously broadening and deepening our appreciation for
these two timely thinkers and providing us with a critical apparatus for navigating this
brave new world of the obscene.
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